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Case Western Reserve School of Law
Panelists:
JACK G. DAY
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Ohio State Employment Relations Board
ARviD ANDERsON
Chairman
New York City Office of Collective Bargaining
MR. MARVIN FELDMAN: The comment I have pertains to the
Act's being cumbersome for the people who work under it. Many
of the units are involved in collective bargaining for the first time,
especially the Fraternal Order of Police, the International Association of Firefighters, and some of the school districts that want to
resolve the problems themselves rather than call on their international representatives.
As a result, when a factfinder walks into a situation, he now
finds himself faced with thirty-five or forty issues from the employer
and the union, who had never been involved in collective bargaining
prior to this, because many of the units are in areas where the state
has not been involved in collective bargaining previously and many
of these groups on both the management side or the labor side do
not want outside counsel. Because of the statutory time limits, the
parties not being advised of collective bargaining prior to this time,
the multitude of issues, and the time element, it is difficult to make
the parties understand that collective bargaining means change.
I am wondering if the State Employment Relations Board has
any mechanism that can limit the number of issues at least in the
initial contract confrontation under the statute.
Further, many of the employees in bargaining units and employers realize that if the unit is a safety force the parties are entitled to
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a conciliation session. As a result, they are using the factfnding
procedure as a first step and not as the final one.
This is the problem created by the parties' pragmatic approach
to the situation which, perhaps, someone insulated in the ivy walls
of your office, Judge Day, may not realize, nor be confronted with.
I am just wondering if this problem can be addressed, at least for
first-time bargaining situations.
JUDGE JACK G. DAY: I don't think it can be addressed under
the statute as it stands unless, peripherally, you might be able to
reach it under the management rights section which deals with permissive and mandatory subjects but is followed by an exception
which states that except as these rights may affect wages, hours, and
in terms of conditions of employment. I can think of no management right that does not affect wages, hours, terms and conditions
of employment. That is our only avenue.
What you are asking for is a sophistication in bargaining, which
many of these units will not have had because they have not bargained prior to this time. I would suspect that police and fire fighters have bargained more than many of the other units. As a matter
of fact, without being precise in the way one ought to be when quoting statistics for proof, my impression from watching the certifications through the Board is that the police and firemen seem to be
voting for representation probably more often than any other single
category except, perhaps, school teachers.
MR. FELDMAN: I am thinking about a fourteen-man police department, which has three units: radio dispatchers, all patrolmen
with the rank of sergeant and above, and all others below the rank
of sergeant. The three units at the bargaining table represent separate communities of interest who have never bargained before.
They each have thirty-seven issues to discuss.
There is a limit as to what should be spent by the state and both
parties in collective bargaining. However, each group is set in its
ways. The employer's representative is accountable to some legislative body. The sergeants have four people to deal with, the patrolmen have seven, and the dispatchers have three. We as factfinders
have final authority, but we can't get the different groups to understand that collective bargaining means change. The point is that I
wish the factfinding process could be limited in some way; it would
really help us.
JUDGE DAY: I really don't know how to answer that, because I
have no knowledge of what the answer is. It's like describing the
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problems of peace and then saying, "I have nothing to say about
how to resolve these difficulties." In time, as expenses mount and
public opinion is agitated, the parties may decide that it is better to
resolve some of these issues than to let them proliferate. That
sounds like a situation in which the possibilities of an alternative
process have stifled collective bargaining.
The situation is similar to that with the War Labor Board which
really interfered with collective bargaining: people would refuse to
yield on the ground that the Board was going to decide the issue.
That same process may be going on in our system. Marvin, frankly,
I have no answer to it. Maybe Mr. Anderson does.
MR. ARVID ANDERSON: There is an approach that could be
tried, but I won't guarantee it would work. When there are a multiplicity of issues and a limited amount of time, you may ask whether
the parties can focus on economic issues only. Then you can either
reserve jurisdiction on the other issues, if the parties will permit it,
or suggest that they bargain over these later, once they have agreed
to the economic package.
JUDGE DAY: Mediation is a possibility in any stage in our process. Maybe you would want to mediate, although some people find
a mediating arbitrator an abomination.
MR. ANDERSON: That's true. It may be, but we believe in it.
PROFESSOR CALVIN WILLIAM SHARPE: Let me suggest, Mr.
Feldman, that your question does overlap with points that will be
made in the next segment relating to unit determination. It maybe
that you will get more relief, if you are not totally satisfied at this
point, during that segment of the discussion. Yes, Professor
Drotning.
PROFESSOR JOHN DROTNING: A problem that comes up concerns the issue of final offers. The parties submit the offers five days
prior to the hearing, but the conciliator, under the statute, still can
mediate. If the conciliator mediates, but isn't successful in getting
the parties to agree, but is successful in getting one side to modify,
for instance, the union drops from a ten percent to seven percent
increase which is a more realistic demand in the eyes of the neutral
than the ten percent, then that increases the probability that the
conciliator will accept the union's mediated demand. Management
then says, "Look, we predicated our three percent offer on the
ground that we knew, or expected, or anticipated that the union
would ask for ten percent. That figure was unreasonable. As a result, you would have to go to three, and we do not want you to view
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the union's modified demand from ten to seven as their final offer,
instead you must consider the ten."
I have been in that situation, and I don't know what the answer
is. I don't know whether I should view the final offers as those put
into SERB five days prior to my hearing, or whether I can go ahead
and mediate-maybe not make it, but certainly put one side or the
other into a more reasonable posture than they might have been
initially. In fact, then they may be in a more reasonable posture
than their opponent.
That's my problem. It is a very real problem I face, and I don't
know the answer.
JUDGE DAY: I don't know that SERB can give you an answer.
Under the statute, as I read it, you cannot compromise your award.
If you cannot mediate the issue, you must choose one offer or the
other.
PROFESSOR DROTNING: I would revert to looking at their initial submissions to SERB. I could not view any unilateral modification by one party or the other as their final offer.
JUDGE DAY: I believe that is what a reading of the statute will
support. I don't know how that particular issue would get to the
SERB Board. It might get to a court if your award attempted a
compromised solution, and a party appealed it under section 2711.
PROFESSOR DROTNING:

Could a union, during or after a hear-

ing, submit to me [the conciliator] a revised final position in writing
which differed from the initial position submitted to SERB?
JUDGE DAY: I see your point, and I think your question is a
little bit like asking can you sue the Bishop of Boston for veracity,
which you clearly can.
The question is: Can you recover? I don't know if the union in
your question would be able to find a common pleas court that
would agree that the compromise settlement satisfies the statute's
approach. However, it's worth trying, I presume, but it wouldn't
come to us.
PROFESSOR DROTNING: Thank you.
PROFESSOR ROGER ABRAMS: I wanted to raise with Mr. Anderson the role of the neutral, either factfinder or arbitrator, as being legislative as opposed to adjudicative, because I think that may
be one of the more controversial issues that you raised in your
suggestions.
As a neutral, I would feel very uncomfortable seeing myself in a
legislative role.
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First of all, there is the question of legitimacy: who elected me?
Second, as a neutral, I would feel more comfortable as an adjudicator, matching the facts of the case against the statutory standards, than taking personal responsibility for determining what I,
think the parties deserve.
Finally, neutrals never know enough about local problems, particularly the intricacies of the parties' relationship, and I'm going to
come in and "legislate," for them? I'll come in and adjudicate but
at least I can say I had to do it; I had no choice; it's what the statute
required.
MR. ANDERSON:

Whatever makes your psyche happy is fine.

But I suggest to you that the last reason is the reason why you
should not be primarily an adjudicator. You don't know enough,
not being in the situation; therefore, you are dealing essentially with
a delegated legislative authority. You may be called a conciliator,
but you may have to adjudicate. Essentially you are allocating public resources and determining conditions of employment.
I am saying you are performing a process which is more akin to
a legislative function than a judicial function. If you don't like the
analogy, live with the problem as best you can. But you are seeking
a solution.
I respectfully suggest that you explore, if given the opportunity,
what the parties want, but only at arm's length. That's the way you
have to play it. But you may be able to discover areas of acceptability, if you attempt to mediate or explore the impact of your decision
on other important forces. You will be more sensitive to the parties'
concerns, for example, of their ability to pay and pay-range patterns. That's why I am saying it is more likely to be an effective
role.
MR. KEIrrH AsHMus: I have a concern about the notion that
there ought to be some kind of a document attached to a mutually
agreeable dispute settlement.
The statute, as I read it, just talks about whether the settlement
is mutually agreed upon. In connection with a situation involving
police, for example, I can think of reasons why both parties would
be interested in agreeing to not having a conciliator decide for them
but still not, perhaps, of having the finality of the strike option. For
a number of years we have had settlements in Ohio without anything more final than mediation involved. In light of this practice, I
wonder where this notion comes from.
It really does worry me that the statute requires factfinding to
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take place on nonsafety issues. That is the first thing I try to avoid
in almost all situations, with wholehearted agreement from most of
the unions.
JUDGE DAY: Frequently we find people contesting over
whether or not they do have a superceding MAD (mutually agreeable dispute settlement). In the Columbus case, the city said, "We
have a mediation process." The union says, "Nonsense, we do not
have a superceding MAD."
I want to hold on to something Mr. Anderson said about legislation and adjudication. This distinction has always seemed to me to
be a fuzzy concept. Judges legislate all the time. If they say "yes,"
then it's legislation; and if they say "no," it's legislation. Indeed,
the legislature expects them to do this. Otherwise, how do you get
content in generalizations? The judges have to do it. In situations
like this parties come to us and say "We have no MAD." The other
side says "Hold on! Yes, we do." Somebody has to decide whether
it is or is not. If you have this responsibility of deciding whether
there is a MAD, then it is incumbent upon you to give some reasons
for your decision. One aspect of those reasons is: does the agreement provide for a final settlement? That's as far as we have gone.
I would think that is a fair interpretation of the total thrust of the
Act.
The thrust of the Act is, it seems to me, that there be no strikes
in the safety forces and there be a limited right to strike by nonsafety forces. That being the case, I doubt very much that one
could make a sufficient case for the proposition that the parties to a
safety force agreement could bargain away the strike impediment.
Would you agree with that?
I had this argument from a management representative at a public hearing, and he said, "Absolutely, we can do whatever we like."
I asked, "Would you include the right to strike; you know we are
talking about policemen? He said, "Oh no, that is a different
matter."
MR. ASHMUS: Change of the statute makes the common law of
Ohio effective, and strikes are otherwise illegal.
JUDGE DAY: I don't know if that answers your question, but
you see, these duties are thrust upon us. Obviously, whatever the
parties can do for themselves is imminently fairer than anything we
can do for them. But sometimes the parties do not arrive at settlements; they arrive at impasse.
MR. ASHMUS: I guess in Columbus you could have decided, "I
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don't think there really was an agreement," without deciding that
whatever agreement there was, was almost improper because it
lacked finality.
JUDGE DAY: Well, we think that we have an obligation to give
guidance to the parties. One of the functions of precedent is to have
some impact upon future controversies of the same kind. We are
trying gradually to build a fabric of precedent which will help decide some of these issues so that parties will not be back; and if we
take a totally innocuous course, we have not done very much.
PROFESSOR ABRAMS: Mr. Anderson and Judge Day, have there
been any citizens' councils appointed?
JUDGE DAY: Not that I know of.
PROFESSOR ABRAMS: Do you foresee the formation of any citizens' councils-a lovely innovation?
JUDGE DAY: I don't have any basis for making a judgment on
that. Sometimes things happen that we don't know about. If there
is a MAD, it should be registered with us, but parties don't always
do what they are supposed to do, and they may be out in the boondocks creating councils all over the place. I have never heard of
any.

MR. ALAN WoHL: I am concerned about the final offer, because that as a procedure, seems to force the parties to simply underplay what they might be willing to accept, and it interferes with
the negotiation process. I would like to hear your comments on
that.
JUDGE DAY: Mr. Anderson has far more experience than I in
this particular field. I have no doubt at all that it interferes, in some
measure, with the bargaining process. But by the time you get to
conciliation, it is assumed that bargaining has been pretty well exhausted. To the degree that it is not so, mediation, at that point, is
in order. Maybe it ought to be that you should be allowed to compromise an interest arbitration issue, but I think that it is a reaching
reading of the statute to say that our Act allows it. Although I
believe in what you would call a liberal jurisprudence, I do think
the legislature is entitled to tell us what we are to do and that we are
obligated to do it.
MR. ANDERSON: I certainly won't quarrel with that. Again,
with Professor Abrams' comments about not adjudicating and Professor Drotning's comments, if you are confined in your role as a
conciliator to selecting between final offers issue by issue, obviously
your role is more that of an adjudicator than that of a mediator. At
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least with issue by issue, you have something to work with, and you
might do some exploring of acceptabilities.
While in Professor Drotning's illustration there was no consent
to a modification, it is conceivable that there might be certain circumstances where there might be a modification permitted, if not of
one offer, perhaps, then, of another. You never know until you ask.
Anybody who spent any time mediating knows if you accept what
people tell you the first hundred times you ask them, then you don't
belong in the business. So you have to try to be persistent about
that, and try to find a solution.
MR. RIcHARD Ross: Mr. Anderson, based on your experience
in multiple jurisdictions, what happens when the parties agree to
MAD and then the electors in a home jurisdiction decide to vote to
change that procedure?
MR. ANDERSON: I don't know enough about the problems of
the Ohio statute, but I assume that ultimately that problem is going
to be one that SERB would have to accept because, while the Ohio
Act permits MADs, Judge Day's comments imply that they must
meet particular standards: whether they cover particular periods of
disputes, whether they can be repealed retroactively, or whether the
agreement is bound for a particular time. There are all kinds of
questions to ask. I don't have a ready answer to that.
PROFESSOR SHARPE: Yes, Mr. Brown.
MR. EARL BROWN (AMERICAN ARBrrRATION ASSOCIATION):
I think what I heard was a comment that to go from conciliation to
mediation or vice versa was, in essence, a compromise. I'm just
wondering if that doesn't suggest a lack of flexibility in conflict resolution. The real concern is to resolve the problem with a process or
procedure that might, in some instances, use a little more flexibility
in transferring from one procedure to the other to resolve the
problems. I was just wondering if that would ever become a
practice?
JUDGE DAY: I think you did not hear that we were not in favor
of compromise. We were talking about whether an arbitrator faced
with issue by issue arbitration under our statute could compromise
by order. He can certainly compromise by mediation, he has the
authority to do it. The time may come when what Professor Drotning suggests may come about, you do not have a fixed final offer, so
that you can move a bit.
You can determine pretty early in mediation whether that is a
possibility, and I would suppose that any arbitrator, conciliator
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under our nomenclature, could or would explore that possibility.
But I believe that if he cannot make it or if that refinement of our
doctrine does not take place so that the final offer can be modified,
then the arbitrator has no alternative other than to choose one offer
or the other. That is the way I understand baseball arbitration to
be. Either you take this offer or you take that offer; there is no inbetween.
MR. ANDERSON: That's true; that's absolutely true.
PROFESSOR SHARPE: If there is no further response to that
question, I have a question for Mr. Anderson about time tables.
How would you amend the New York statute which, I understand
does not carry any time tables, to establish reasonable time tables. I
guess the bottom line question is what would be a reasonable time
table to accommodate public sector interests in a dispute
settlement?
MR. ANDERSON: A couple of brief comments. The New York
statute didn't provide time tables because there were so many fragmented bargaining units in the state when the statute was enacted
initially that it would have been literally impossible to establish time
tables when the agency was trying to deal with almost five hundred
units.
The Postal Service Act is an example of one that does have time
tables. It has a fixed time table, and the parties have met the deadlines. I think they have a forty-five day procedure which is similar
to the procedures of presidential emergency boards. If you look at
the Railway Labor Act or the Postal Act, there are procedures
which can be enacted; but if you have a very large number of bargaining units in your jurisdiction, you have a difficult task. Judge
Day mentioned the possibility of a number of state units. If there
are more than a dozen or so, you can have a hard time focusing,
individually, if there are several organizations.
I would think one way of establishing time tables would be by a
MAD agreement that meets the needs of that particular jurisdiction. You ought to spell out in the agreement if you need more time
for mediation, or if you agree to waive certain steps. But if you
have a fixed statute, it wonderfully focuses the mind. People do
decide. The calendar is inexorable.
JUDGE DAY: Like the prospect of hanging.
MR. ANDERSON: That's right. It focuses. So put it in a statute. I would put a sixty- to ninety-day time table in the New York
statute.
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JUDGE DAY: Let me ask you, Arvid, what would you think of a
process that left the demand for a mediation or factfinding up to one
of the parties? That would keep the procedure from dragging on
forever, presumably, and at the same time, put a maximum amount
of flexibility into the Act. There would be a termination point as
well as a reservation of power in the Board to step in if there was an
emergency that required a quicker solution.
MR. ANDERSON: Your idea is in contrast with the Ohio statutory mandate that the state take the initiative. I don't see anything
wrong with that, because it places a responsibility on the parties.
PROFESSOR SHARPE: Is there a way to interpret the notice provision in the Ohio Act so that the ninety days in the case of an
initial agreement would not begin to run until a party filed a notice,
with no particular restriction on when that notice should be filed?
Would that solve the problem?
JUDGE DAY: I suppose the parties could deal with one another
and postpone the deal to negotiate. I am speaking maybe out of
turn, anything I say that sounds like a rule is not intended to be. I
suppose they can bargain, get themselves to virtually an impasse in
their bargaining, and then file a notice to negotiate, and then have
sixty days or ninety days as in the initial agreement situation. I
have not seen that yet, but the ingenuity of lawyers and others is
such that I would be surprised if somebody didn't come up with
that at some junction.
AUDIENCE PARTICIPANT: In the case where the fiscal policy as
to retroactivity is concerned, it might not be good for the bargaining
unit.
JUDGE DAY: Well, that is the trouble. This fiscal policy problem is one which motivates procrastination. I knew a fellow who
talked about a tendency to accelerate delay. I think this is one of
those concepts. We have the power, as I suggested earlier, to fashion a remedy which could take retroactivity into account. The Columbus judge did not buy that but, of course, the war is not over.
That's just an opening salvo.
PROFESSOR SHARPE: If there are no further questions, we will
now take a break, then we will come back for the presentations of
Professor Knapp and Mr. O'Reilly.

